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Forum Juridicum
The Judge as a Person
Albert Tate, jr.*
Eleven short years ago your speaker sat in one of the back
seats in this same hall in his last semester at law school. In se-
lecting a topic which might be of some interest to you, it oc-
curred to me that many of you might be, as I was then, unfamil-
iar with the concept of the judge as a fellow human in the per-
formance of his functions in the judicial process. My remarks
of today will therefore concern the judge as a person and as a
personality in relation to the law and the practice of the law.
In making these remarks, you must pardon me for assuming
on your part the same naivete and lack of common sense con-
cerning the subject which the speaker found in himself upon his
own graduation from law school. Just as many if not most of
you have never had the opportunity to be closely associated with
or to observe from day to day a murderous psychopath or a dope
peddler, so by the law of mathematical probabilities most of you
have not had the opportunity for close association with one of
Louisiana's two hundred judges among its five thousand lawyers
and three million people.
So I will start with a very trite and commonplace observa-
tion: like the psychopath; like the dope peddler - the judge is a
human being. Perhaps a few of you may share the innocence of
your speaker when he graduated from law school. I regarded
the Law as something written on pages in books, as something
existing independent and apart from human life; I did not real-
ize that the case law found in the lawbooks is written by human
beings serving as judges, and is written in the course of decid-
ing controversies arising in the stream of human life.
If you had asked me at that time to describe the application
of law through our judges - that is, to describe our machinery
of justice - I think I would have imagined that a lawyer's func-
tion would be to feed the law he finds, through his brief and
argument, into a sort of Univac, which after matching up the
facts and legal principles against the Law (comprised of the stat-
*Judge, First Circuit Court of Appeal. This address was delivered to the stu-
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utes and the previously decided cases), would click out the cor-
rect answer. My concept of the judge was of a faceless intellect
who simply matched up the opposing legal arguments and by a
process of pure logic, with a few Latin maxims thrown in, enun-
ciated the correct result.
Of course, the judicial process cannot be described so simply.
In the first place, the very fact that there is a controversy in
court may indicate that no statute or previously reported judicial
decision affords any definite guide to disposition of the present
case. It may indicate, contrariwise, that several statutes and sev-
eral prior precedents indicate several possible dispositions of the
present controversy. In either event, the decision may require a
creative act on the part of the judge, the resolution of a new
legal principle or selection of an old one from otherwise inap-
plicable precedents to supply an answer to a completely new
legal problem.
In the second place the judges who are the instruments of
justice, far from being "faceless intellects," are neither faceless
nor (in all probability) intellects. They are men who formerly
served as lawyers, who are trying sincerely to render justice
within the discipline of the judicial craft, but who in all proba-
bility like all other human beings have limitations of vision,
knowledge, intelligence, or predisposition which sometimes in-
fluence their judicial actions, however much they conscientiously
try to avoid the occasion of error.
It may well seem to you somewhat superfluous on my part
to remind you that judges are mere mortals. But I am speaking
to you now not in your future capacity as conservators and ad-
ministrators of our judicial process, through whose efforts
justice is effectuated whether the side you represent wins or
loses: I am speaking to you as future advocates, charged with
the high responsibility to your client (once having accepted his
case) to represent his point of view to the utmost of your ability
-bluntly, being charged with winning your client's case by all
possible ethical means.
Continuing to speak bluntly, in discharging this duty to your
clients, in close cases you not only have to take into account the
statutes and prior reported cases covering the subject. You must
also take into account the judge or judges before whom you must
argue your case and through whom the law applicable to your
case will be enunciated.
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I do not say this in any derogatory or debunking sense. Al-
most without exception, our judges in the performance of their
duties attempt to lay aside their own limitations and attempt to
perform impartially their duties. In the vast and overwhelming
majority of cases the same result will be reached, irrespective of
the ability of the lawyer or of the personality of the judge.
But with all the willingness and sincerity in the world, dif-
ferent results do sometimes flow from different judges or from
the varying ability of lawyers to argue their points of view.
Using the statistics of my own First Circuit Court of Appeal
over the past four years, our court has handled from two hun-
dred to two hundred and forty cases a year, and in 20-25% of
them the decision below was reversed by us on appeal. In ap-
proximately 5-7% of our cases, one of our three judges dissented
from the ruling of the majority. Last year, the Supreme Court
granted writs as to approximately 3% of our opinions, and re-
versed us in almost every case in which a writ was granted.
As these statistics may indicate to you, different judges reach
varying results in disposing of the same set of facts by the same
legal principles in an appreciable (although far from preponder-
ant) number of instances. Again, let me reiterate, this circum-
stance casts no reflection upon the sincerity or learning of any
of the judges involved. It simply indicates that, especially in
appeals (which have a greater tendency than do unappealed
cases to involve frontiers of new and undecided questions of our
law or borderline factual situations), several judges may with
equal sincerity and equal reason reach different results. Under
our system of law, however, regardless of the theoretical correct-
ness of any other point of view, that reached by the highest ap-
pellate court involved is, for practical purposes, the correct dis-
position of that particular case.
Now, my friends, sooner or later most of you will go forth
into the practice of law. You will soon become immediately con-
cerned on a day-to-day basis with your local district judge or
judges and will be involved on occasion with your courts of ap-
peal and supreme court judges.
In arguing a contested case before your trial judge, you will
undoubtedly as you get to know him better take into account his
personal attributes. You will know, for instance, whether the
field of law in which your litigation arises is one with which he
is thoroughly familiar or is one, upon the other hand, in which
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you should enlighten him even as to fundamentals. You will
know whether he is a judge who prefers a factual argument as to
the equity of the merits to aid him in the decision of the case,
or whether he is a judge who prefers the citation of authority;
and if the latter, whether he prefers quotations from a multi-
tudinous number of cases, or just citation of a few closely similar
prior decisions.
In thus appealing to your judge's preferences in order to aid
your client to receive a favorable decision, you are doing nothing
improper. These preferences of his do not make your judge any
less or any more fair a jurist. They simply indicate that, as a
human factor, different men accomplish the processes of decision
by different means, although they might well reach the same re-
sult in applying the same principle of law to the same set of
facts. In furnishing your judge the type of argument which he
best appreciates, which most efficiently aids his reasoning in the
painful process of giving birth to a decision, you are simply ful-
filling your function of assisting the court to arrive at what
both of you hope will be a correct solution of the legal issues
involved.
Thus, to continue speaking of fundamentals which everyone
knows but which a surprising number of lawyers ignore, in writ-
ing a brief it is well not only for the lawyer to find the correct
law for his own satisfaction, it is well also to present it for the
most ready use of the judge to whom the brief is presented. It
is not only a nice thing to have read and to cite all the cases sur-
rounding the point and to have further checked to see that the
effect of the holding has not been changed by subsequent juris-
prudence; it is well, in citing these cases, to inform the court of
this research and to cite them correctly. (It is surprising the
number of times a case is cited at the wrong volume of the South-
ern Reporter, or that only the Louisiana or the Southern citation
is given, often causing further labor to the judge to find the de-
cision upon which the lawyer relies.)
If the lawyer intends to rely on a case, it is well for him to
spend the effort to summarize briefly the facts, to show that
under the facts the cited case is applicable to the present situa-
tion, rather than glibly to refer to a factually inapposite case
on the basis of favorable dicta to be discovered only after burrow-
ing laboriously through many irrelevant pages. If the lawyer
quotes from the cited decision itself, it is of course a lot easier
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for him to have his secretary copy several pages; but it will aid
the judge a lot more and assist him in appreciating why the case
is cited if only the relevant sentences are quoted in their context,
if quotation at all is necessary rather than a summary of the
holding under the facts.
These obvious suggestions spring from the circumstance that
in modern times, with the telephone and our ever more crowded
population, the modern practitioner finds himsef more and more
pressed for time. Often in such a situation, the practitioner has
a tendency to leave it to the judge to weed out the irrelevant
and unnecessary rather than to take his own time and effort
to do so.
However, the judge, as a fellow-worker in the legal vineyard,
is also in this day of overcrowded dockets often very much him-
self pressed for time. In justice to him and in justice to the
client, any of the judge's effort or time that the lawyer can save
will enable the judge to understand more expeditiously and effi-
ciently the lawyer's point of view and that of his client.
Equally applicable to appellate judges are these foregoing re-
marks concerning persuasion of a trial judge to decide a case
favorably or at least more efficiently. But, in the normal course
of events, after you enter practice you will not be as familiar on
a day to day basis with the appellate judges as human beings and
will not, so to speak, as readily know what makes them tick.
However, in your mail each week there is a means by which you
can realize how each of your appellate judges in this state ex-
presses himself as to the legal questions decided by his court -
and by this I mean the weekly advance sheets of the Southern
Reporter.
My distinguished predecessor on the court of appeal, the late
and beloved Judge Hugo Dor6, told me as a young lawyer fresh
out of law school, that I should regard the advance sheets as my
bible. He told me that when he had been in active practice, each
week when the Southern Reporter came in he retired into his pri-
vate office and told his secretary that he could see no clients
until he had finished reading that week's advance sheets. While
perhaps many may feel that such practice is not possible in their
own situation, it may be well to heed the advice to not let a week
go by without having read or at least scanned your Southern Re-
porter, even if you take it home with you. The law, as you know,
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is not a static set of rules but a constantly developing area of
human experience in which principles perhaps age-old in origin
are daily applied to the ever-changing problems of human ex-
istence. The law itself by imperceptible steps grows more com-
plex and changes as human life, the milieu from which the law
takes meaning, itself grows more complex and changes.
But we are not at the moment speaking of the value of read-
ing the advance sheets in the fulfillment of the vocation you have
chosen by entering and completing your course at this school,
that you will not only be a practitioner of but be also a lifelong
student of the Law. We are now speaking of the value of read-
ing the advance sheets to know better the minds and attitudes
of the appellate judges before whom a case is to be argued.
Now, as an appellate judge, I am sometimes surprised (al-
though I should not be, realizing how busy most practitioners
are), to find an advocate getting up before us and blindly argu-
ing contrary to several of our recently reported cases, with an
apparent ignorance of the courts' recent expressions relating to
his own legal point or to related or peripheral legal problems. If
an appellate judge has expressed himself strongly and emphatic-
ally upon a certain subject, whether it be in a majority opinion
or in a dissent, it is often better, as a simple matter of human
relations, to avoid hitting him over the head, if possible, with a
different view. On the other hand, if the judge's position is
necessarily incorrect for an advocate's own view to prevail, this
circumstance cannot be avoided, and it is preferable to bring it
into the open at the outset frankly, although diplomatically.
In an oral argument before an appellate body, having pre-
pared his brief comprehensively and helpfully for the appellate
court as he did for the trial court with a full consideration of the
current views of the appellate tribunal, a lawyer's function is not
simply to read what is in his brief. His brief and the cases cited
therein will be read by the court or by that member of the court
to which the case is assigned. The advocate's further function is
to stimulate the judges before whom the case is argued to a prop-
er appreciation of the issues involved, to enlighten the court by
the highlights (and preferably only the highlights) concerning
the legal considerations which should be applicable to the de-
cision of the question, and, perhaps, above all to satisfy the
judge's intellectual quest that the advocate's is the fair solution
of the problem. An oral argument, then, as I see it, attempts to
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stimulate the court to an appreciation of the issues before it, to
leave an impression as to the fair solution of the problem, and to
answer any doubts that the court may have against your posi-
tion. The final decision will be reached of course only after de-
tailed study of the authorities cited in the briefs and, perhaps,
after additional independent research.
It must be remembered that the judges sitting on that appel-
late court are human beings charged with the duty to administer
justice. They are not charged with the duty of writing decisions
that will satisfy the law reviews and law professors, however
synonymous the scholarly views of these excellent independent
sources of legal thinking often are with a just solution of the
controversy. The judges are not charged with evaluating, ir-
respective of the merits of the case, the forensic ability of the
respective counsel; nor are they charged with determining what
a fair solution of the controversy might have been in 1820 or
1830 or 1920 or 1930 under the then existing facts and circum-
stances. The judges are simply charged with a duty to find,
under the existing jurisprudence and existing set of facts and
within the discipline of the judicial craft, the fair solution of the
legal question presented to them.
Having this in mind, questions from the bench should not be
regarded as interruptions of a skillfully prepared legal argu-
ment. They should be regarded rather as an opportunity to enter
into the mind of the questioning judge, to understand what is
concerning him, and to enlighten him as to the merits of the
cause in the phase presented by the question from the bench.
In connection with appellate argument, the commentary of a
veteran Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin found in an
article entitled, "Confidential Chat on the Craft of Briefing," in
Volume 57 of the Wisconsin Law Review, states, rather per-
ceptively in my opinion, as follows:
"The most persuasive arguments are factual rather than
legal. Possibly that is because Law has borrowed infinitely
more from Equity than Law has the courage to admit. If
facts can be clarified to the degree that the barber, the
grocer, and the shoemaker would consider that a certain re-
sult should follow as a matter of common sense; the proba-
bilities are that the judge will arrive at the same conclusion.
There is this difference, however; the judge, because of his
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specialized training, can express the rationale of the decision
in profound language that fits into the juristic scheme. An
unfair analogy would be the witch doctor who may produce
cures without knowing why, and the highly skilled medical
expert who cures, but can also give a scientific explanation -
or, at least, something that sounds like one. A plausible the-
ory is that every human being considers himself an amateur
judge; when a judge turns professional, his judgments ac-
quire sanctions, but his thinking habits fortunately remain
those of the amateur. . . ." (Emphasis added).'
But however much the appellate judge desires to render com-
mon sense justice under the facts, certain restrictions - the dis-
cipline of his craft - inhibit him from administering justice
solely on his own idea of what is fair.
Legislative enactments, for instance, may not be disregarded
simply because the judge feels they produce an unfair result in
the instant case. Long-established precedents may not lightly be
disregarded. Nor may the stringent public policy of this state
expressed by statute and countless decisions be ignored in order
to avoid inequitable results in an individual case, such as that
policy (to take a single instance) requiring title to immovables
to be proved by writings and only by writings.
For our legal system requires not only that equity be reached
wherever possible in individual cases; it also requires some con-
sistency and predictability of result based upon past decisions,
so that lawyers and their clients may expect certain legal conse-
quences to attach to their acts should litigation ever result there-
from. A litigated case reported on appeal serves not only to
record the decision in the instant case, but to provide a guide by
which other people may regulate their conduct insofar as legal
consequences ensue, and it further provides a guide for the dis-
position of scores and perhaps hundreds of unlitigated cases and
unappealed decisions which would otherwise require a fresh de-
termination by our highest court in each instance.
A further example of the discipline to which our craft in its
appellate manifestation is subject is the doctrine that in civil
cases an appellate tribunal may not disregard a trial court's
factual determination unless the latter is manifestly erroneous,
since (unlike the appellate court which merely reads the record)




the trial judge sees and hears the witnesses and is better able to
evaluate their credibility. Because of this restriction, for in-
stance, I have on several occasions had to write or to sign opin-
ions affirming judgments, although I had strong personal reser-
vations as to the correctness of the factual findings of the trial
court.
Thus, an advocate in appealing to the sense of fairness of
the reviewing bench cannot simply argue that his own recom-
mended solution is the fairest. The advocate must additionally
take into account such restrictions upon the power of appellate
review and he must, if he for example desires the decision below
to be changed, argue not only that it should be changed but that
it can, by a self-respecting court exercising the self restraint
called for by the tradition of our judiciary.
But, in glibly stating that the effort of a practitioner on ap-
pellate argument is to persuade the appellate tribunal, within the
discipline of the judicial craft, to see that his solution is the fair
one to the legal controversy, I have glossed over a really central
problem.
In a very rare percentage of cases resulting from very close
litigation, the individual views of the judges as to what is fair
become decisive, due for example to the absence or conflict of
prior precedents. There, in these very rare cases, the court is
creatively free to apply the conflicting principles of law ad-
vanced, in such manner as to produce the result the court itself
thinks is most fair.
But with all the learning, scholarship, ability, vision, integ-
rity, and lack of predisposition in the world, two judges of equal
perception may with equal sincerity believe in opposing solutions
as the fairest disposition of the case before them.
Such differences involve a matter of philosophy, the entire
set of views and entire history of the judges before whom such a
case is argued. The proper role of the advocate in such matters,
as I perceive it, is to attempt to understand the policy motiva-
tions involved and to frame his argument with frank reference
thereto, with as well of course the citation of appropriate legal
authority, in order to persuade or reconcile as many of the
judges in the tribunal as possible to the advocate's point of view
as more consistent than his opponent's with the past expressed
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opinions and policy motivations of the appellate judges or jus-
tices concerned.
This vague advice may not be of much help to you. To the
contrary, it will be a tremendous hindrance if you rely on public
policy in routine cases to the exclusion of precedent or other legal
argument.
Looking at you in your fresh enthusiasm for the profession
to which you have chosen to dedicate your lives, it has not been
my intention to lessen your respect for the impersonal majesty
of the law by pointing out that it is produced and administered
by men who naturally are subject to the intellectual frailties of
all other human beings. The simple purpose of this talk has been
to point out the practical and obvious application of such an ob-
servation.
But the realization that the law is produced and administered
by equally fallible beings, rather than decreasing our respect for
the judicial process, should inspire admiration for the human
achievement in formulating from myriad efforts our great sys-
tem of law. We may well be struck by the wonder and miracle
of human intelligence and human integrity which, despite the
imperfections of the human agents who are the constituent parts
of our judicial process, produce in the majesty of the law a legal
system whose breadth and compassion and fairness and intellect
distills from these imperfect human contributions a substance
finer and fairer than could be imagined by any of the mortals
who contributed their best thought and most selfless service to
this end.
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